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Efficacy of contact tracing for the containment of the
2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19)
Matt J Keeling ,1 T Deirdre Hollingsworth ,2 Jonathan M Read3,4
ABSTRACT
Objective Contact tracing is a central public health
response to infectious disease outbreaks, especially in the
early stages of an outbreak when specific treatments are
limited. Importation of novel coronavirus (COVID-19)
from China and elsewhere into the UK highlights the need
to understand the impact of contact tracing as a control
measure.
Design Detailed survey information on social encounters
from over 5800 respondents is coupled to predictive
models of contact tracing and control. This is used to
investigate the likely efficacy of contact tracing and the
distribution of secondary cases that may go untraced.
Results Taking recent estimates for COVID-19
transmission we predict that under effective contact
tracing less than 1 in 6 cases will generate any subsequent
untraced infections, although this comes at a high
logistical burden with an average of 36 individuals traced
per case. Changes to the definition of a close contact can
reduce this burden, but with increased risk of untraced
cases; we find that tracing using a contact definition
requiring more than 4 hours of contact is unlikely to
control spread.
Conclusions The current contact tracing strategy within
the UK is likely to identify a sufficient proportion of
infected individuals such that subsequent spread could be
prevented, although the ultimate success will depend on
the rapid detection of cases and isolation of contacts.
Given the burden of tracing a large number of contacts to
find new cases, there is the potential the system could be
overwhelmed if imports of infection occur at a rapid rate.
Contact tracing is the main public health response to
importations of rare or emerging infectious diseases,
and was implemented in the UK during the ‘contain-
ment stage’ of the 2009 influenza pandemic.1 In
more recent years, contact tracing was also
a valuable tool following the importation of the
Ebola virus disease into the UK in 20142 and the
cases of monkeypox in the UK in 2018.3 In general,
contact tracing is a highly effective and robust strat-
egy given sufficient resources. The main advantages
are that it can identify potentially infected indivi-
duals before severe symptoms emerge, and if con-
ducted sufficiently quickly can prevent onward
transmission from the secondary cases. Contact tra-
cing has proven hugely successful in the treatment of
sexually transmitted infections, where the definition
of a contact is relatively straightforward, where the
infection is often asymptomatic and where the time-
scales of transmission are slow.4 In contrast, the use
of contact tracing for novel invading pathogens has
received less quantitative consideration, in part due
to greater uncertainties over social contact structure
(although see5 6) Modelling studies have often
focused on quantifying the importance of pre-
symptomatic and pre-tracing infectiousness, but
are usually based on statistical distributions of con-
tact networks.7 8 Here we leverage detailed social
network data from the UK to model both transmis-
sion and the act of tracing, and identify the implica-
tions of early contact tracing for containment of
a novel pathogen, using parameters for the novel
coronavirus (COVID-19).9 10
METHODS
We characterised contact patterns in the UK using
a postal and online cross-sectional survey, which
asked participants to report the number of social
encounters with unique individuals during a -
given day, as well as the duration and typical fre-
quency of those encounters.11 12 In total, 5802
respondents reported more than 50 000 encoun-
ters—one of the biggest studies of its kind to date.
The definition of a contact used in the survey was
a face-to-face conversation within 3 m or where
skin-on-skin touch occurred. This will naturally
include all conversational contacts within 2 m (the
standard definition for a contact for COVID-19
tracing), but is unlikely to represent a significant
overestimate. The encounter patterns of this study
were in good qualitative agreement with other simi-
lar studies of social interactions.13 14
In this study, the daily encounter data were first
extrapolated to generate a pattern of contacts over
a 14-day period (replicating random encounters and
increasing the total duration of associated regular
contacts), to act as the basis for transmission and
contact tracing simulations (see online appendix 1
for more technical details). Using these extrapolated
data, we can determine which interactions satisfy
a given definition of a close contact for the purpose
of contact tracing. From our social encounter survey,
we consider all reported contacts of 15 min or more
as meeting the close contact definition. From our
social encounter data, we can also distinguish inter-
actions with people who could be later identified and
traced, from those with unidentifiable strangers
(schematic figure 1); althoughwe note that electronic
means of tracing should be able to trace these
individuals.15 We assume that all contact of longer
than 1 hour or repeated contacts can be identified
and traced, whereas shorter duration encounters
with people met for the first time are strangers who
are unidentifiable and therefore untraceable.
The second element of the simulation is to deter-
mine who gets infected from a source case chosen
representatively from the survey respondents. This
transmission process is stochastic, accounting for
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both the time spent with each contact and the infectivity on
each day (see online appendix 1). The transmission rate to
a contact is scaled to generate the required basic reproductive
ratio, R0. Taken together these two predictions allow us to bound
the efficacy of contact tracing.
RESULTS
One of the most notable features of human social contacts is the
huge variability in the number and strength of contacts—which is
reflected as variation in both the number of secondary cases and
the number of individuals that match the contact tracing defini-
tion (figure 2). Using preliminary estimates of COVID-19 trans-
mission (average latent period 4 days, average effective infectious
period 2 days, R0=3, and assuming a simple SEIR formulation
9)
we compute the distribution of epidemiological, social and con-
tact tracing characteristics across the population. Extrapolating
the data from the social contact survey suggests that the average
number of contacts over a 14-day period is 217, although the
distribution is significantly over-dispersed (with a median of 90
and around 3% of individuals having >1000 total contacts). Of
these total encounters, an average of 59 contacts (27%) meet the
definition of a close contact (in contact for >15 min,16) and of
these close-contacts we predict an average of 36 (61%) to be
individuals who can be identified by the infected case and can
therefore be traced. This is comparable to early reports from
Singapore17 and Taiwan18 where 84 and 100 confirmed cases
led to 2593 and 2761 contacts being traced, respectively
(approximately 31 and 27 contacts per case). Therefore, simply
considering social contacts, it is clear that there are very many
short duration contacts that do not meet the definition of a close
contact, and although unlikely to become infected may pose
a risk due to their greater abundance. As expected, tightening
the definition of a close contact can dramatically lower the num-
ber of contacts that would need to be traced: identifying contacts
from 7 days prior to detection reduces the average number of
contacts to 128 (median 55).
Given that the risk of infection increases with the duration of
contact, the distribution of cases effectively represents a biased
sample of all contacts. As expected, given the model assumptions,
the expected number of total secondary cases agrees with the
assumed R0 (mean=3, median=2, and 95th percentiles 0–10).
Given that secondary cases are most likely to be those contacts of
the longest duration, we predict that 95% of cases match the
definition of a close contact. However, not all of these contacts
will be identifiable; assuming that all repeated contacts and con-
tact of longer than 1 hour can be traced, we predict that 93% of
all cases meet the definition and can be identified. However,
because of the extreme heterogeneity in contacts between indivi-
duals and the stochastic nature of transmission, we would still
expect approximately 15% of all primary cases to generate at
least one secondary case that is not traced and 10% to generate
a secondary case that cannot even be identified. Similarly, we
would expect around 3% (10%/R0) of detected cases to not be
able to identify their infecting individual. Neither of these results
Figure 1 (A) Cartoon example of the encounters made during a day by an infectious index case (central figure) with contacts positioned by their total
contact duration. Here, the definition of a contact is someone with whom the index case encountered for 15 min or longer.15 Some contacts will be
identifiable (green), while others will be unidentifiable (orange). A definition of contact that is too restrictive and inappropriate for the infection means
some encounters may fail to meet the definition yet may be at risk of infection; these excluded contacts could be identifiable (light grey) or unidentifiable
(orange). (B) Examples of ego-centric networks collected by the survey.11 12 The participant (ego) is the blue central triangle; circles represent individual
contacts, squares represent groups of contacts (size of group indicated). Colours represent social settings of encounters (red=home, cyan=work/school,
yellow=travel, pink=other). Larger symbol sizes represent longer contact durations, while a closer proximity to the ego indicates the contact is more
frequently encountered.
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should be viewed as a failure of contact tracing, merely
a reflection of the uncertainties in the approach. Aggregating
across all individuals, and under the optimistic assumption that
all the contact tracing can be performed rapidly such that all close
contacts are traced before they become infectious, we expect such
highly effective contact tracing to reduce the basic reproductive
ratio R0 from 3 to 0.18—enabling the outbreak to be contained
(figure 2). Less effective tracing (tracing only a random fraction
of contacts) would lead to a linear scaling in the reduction of the
R0 such that over 71% of contacts need to be traced to reduce R0
below 1 and control the outbreak. This efficacy would need to be
increased if contacts were not traced and isolated before they
were infectious (a problem exasperated by pre-symptomatic
transmission), or could be reduced if the higher risk/longer dura-
tion contacts were preferentially traced.
Rapid and effective contact tracing can therefore be highly
effective in the early control of COVID-19, but places substantial
demands on the local public health authorities. Each new case
requires an average of 36 individuals to be traced, with 8.7% of
cases having more than 100 close traceable contacts (figure 2).
We therefore consider the implications of changing the definition
of a close contact. Clearly, a more strict definition of a close
contact (requiring more contact time) reduces the burden on
the health services as fewer contacts need to be traced, but also
increases the risk of cases being missed. Figure 3 provides
a quantitative assessment of changes to the close contact defini-
tion. Definitions requiring more than 4 hours of contact are
unlikely to control an outbreak as the expected number of
untraced second cases is greater than one. This therefore places
a strict upper bound on the level of contact tracing required. The
added benefit from definitions shorter than 1 hour has relatively
little impact on the mean number of untraced cases (figure 3B),
but does reduce the probability that some untraced contacts
occur.
Throughout we have used a value of R0 that represents
a population-level average once the local infection has become
established. However, the first invasion into any new population
or social setting generally has a larger than expected number of
secondary cases. The first invader enters a completely susceptible
population; moreover all their close contacts (eg, family mem-
bers) are susceptible. In contrast, due to the clustering of contacts,
most secondary cases will be in a landscape with a depleted
number of susceptibles—as close contacts such as family mem-
bers will already have been exposed to the primary case. This
susceptible depletion in the local social network may help to
explain the change in Rt over time reported for COVID-19.
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Figure 2 Distributions associated with transmission and contact tracing. (A) Infectivity over time based on an SEIR model with a latent period of 4 days
(Erlang distribution with shape 3), infectious period of 2 days, R0=3.
9 (B) Frequency distribution of the number contacts over a 14-day period using
colours from figure 1A: white is all contacts; blue are those matching the >15 min definition of a close contact; green are those matching the definition
that are also assumed to be identifiable (met previously or for more than 1 hour), and therefore traceable. (C) Frequency distribution of the number of
secondary cases per index case, again using colours from figure 1A: red is all secondary cases; grey and orange are those that are not traced either
through failing to meet the definition of a close contact or because they are assumed to unidentifiable; orange are all secondary cases that are shorter
than 15 min or unidentifiable.
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We therefore consider the impact of different values of the initial
reproductive ratio (figure 4), which could capture this social
aspect, or could represent heterogeneity between individuals in
the amount of virus shed, or could inform about innate differ-
ences in behaviour between China and the UK. Given the strong
biasing of transmission towards long-duration contacts, the
impact of varying the initial reproductive ratio is less extreme
than might be expected; it is only for the highest values of the
initial reproductive ratio simulated (>9.8) that contact tracing
fails to findmore than one case such that infection can escape.We
also consider sensitivity to alternative formulations and para-
meter values for the epidemiological dynamics, and conclude
that the success of contact tracing against COVID-19 is predo-
minantly driven by the initial reproduction ratio.
CONCLUSIONS
Mathematical models have an important role to play in prepared-
ness for novel infectious diseases, allowing policymakers to plan
for potential public health scenarios before they arise. However,
in such scenarios reliable data are often limited, so predictions of
long-term dynamics are generally associated with wide CIs. In
contrast, while short term predictions are subject to greater sto-
chasticity, the distribution of possible behaviours can be readily
captured. Here we have investigated contact tracing of a close-
contact pathogen, using the 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19)
as the example, and considered the efficacy of contact tracing as
a control measure. This work brings together a detailed survey of
social encounters together with bespoke mathematical modelling
of the transmission and tracing processes. Given the substantial
heterogeneities present in social encounters (both in terms of
duration and number), mathematical models are vital to interpret
the interplay between a low number of high–risk encounters (eg,
household members) and the high number of low–risk less–iden-
tifiable encounters (eg, commuters or retail customers).
Throughout this work we have used a simple definition of
a close contact as anyone being within 3 m of an infected indivi-
dual for 15 min or more, over a 2-week period—relating to the
stipulation in our earlier study. This is likely to be a slight over-
estimate compared to the UK definition which uses a 2 m distance
rule.16 However, other countries and regions have subtly different
protocols19 20 with critical distances ranging from 1.5 to 2 m and
times from 10 to 15 min. Our assumption of tracing all contacts in
a 2-week period is likely to be pessimistic, with most countries
now adopting an interval from 2 days before symptoms to isola-
tion of the patient. Under our default definition, there are unlikely
to be many unidentified secondary cases, although the burden of
tracing all contacts could be large. Relaxing the definition of
a contact (such that longer contact durations are needed) lessens
this burden, but at the greater risk of undetected cases (figure 3).
Surprisingly, moderate changes to the reproductive ratio, within
5m 10m 15m 30m 45m 60m 2h 3h 4h 6h 8h
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
To
ta
l C
on
ta
ct
s 
Tr
ac
ed
5m 10m 15m 30m 45m 60m 2h 3h 4h 6h 8h
0
0.5
1
2
3
5
10
Ca
se
s 
No
t T
ra
ce
d
5m 10m 15m 30m 45m 60m 2h 3h 4h 6h 8h
Time to be a Close Contact
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Pr
ob
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 U
nt
ra
ce
d 
Ca
se
Figure 3 Impact of different assumptions for the definition of a close contact on: (A) the total number of contacts traced per index case; (B) the number
of secondary contacts that are not traced per index case; and (C) the probability that at least one secondary case is not traced per index case. For (A) and
(B) the crosses mark the mean value, boxes contain the 50th percentiles while bars contact the 95th percentiles, and colours correspond to those in
figure 1A—distributions are across all respondents to the survey and across stochastic realisations. (Based on an SEIR model with latent period 4 days,
infectious period 2 days, R0=3
9).
864 Keeling MJ, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2020;74:861–866. doi:10.1136/jech-2020-214051
Original research
copyright.
 o
n
 Septem
ber 11, 2020 by guest. Protected by
http://jech.bmj.com/
J Epidem
iol Com
m
unity Health: first published as 10.1136/jech-2020-214051 on 23 June 2020. Downloaded from 
the bounds estimated from early data,9 10 21 22 or changes to the
time course of infectivity are predicted to have a relatively modest
impact on the success of contact tracing, illustrating the robustness
of this control measure (figure 4).
Our model has addressed the simple and optimistic question of
whether rapid and complete contact tracing is sufficient to iden-
tify secondary infections. The public health reality of contact
tracing is more complex, and depends on the relative timing of
events and the management of identified contacts. For contact
tracing to be an effective public health measure requires most
secondary cases to be discovered and isolated before they become
infectious; hence the time from the primary case becoming infec-
tious to the tracing of their contacts needs to be shorter than the
incubation period. Longer time scales would allow tertiary cases
to be infected and potentially increase the scale of tracing
required. In addition, those contacts that are traced either need
to be effectively screened for infection and quarantined or other-
wise isolated so that they do not pose a risk to others.
We have also assumed that all index infections are identi-
fied as cases and start the process of contact tracing, leading
to the tracing of all identified contacts. This is clearly an
extremely optimistic assumption: not all infections are
symptomatic so may go undetected, and not all those who
are symptomatic will seek medical help; and not all identi-
fied contacts can be traced sufficiently rapidly to prevent
further spread. Therefore, while contact tracing has the
potential to contain COVID-19 (and other close-contact
pathogens) during the early stages of invasion the ultimate
success relies on the speed and efficacy with which suspect
contacts can be contained and the capacity for contact
tracing.
Contact tracing can also be used later in an outbreak to assist
with other control methods in reducing the number of cases.23 In
this scenario, other factors become important: the type and
number of contacts are likely to be extremely different for coun-
tries in or exiting lockdown; the effective reproductive ratio is
likely to be far lower; and household contacts may already self-
isolate making tracing irrelevant. These considerations mean that
contact tracing needs to be less effective to control the infection
(more readily bringing the reproductive ratio below 1) but is
likely to have diminished impact due to the existence of other
measures.
Figure 4 Impact of different values for the initial reproduction number of the primary case; on (A) the number of secondary contacts that are not
traced, and (B) the probability that at least one secondary case is not traced. changing this reproduction number does not affect the number of contacts
traced. For (A) the crosses mark the mean value, boxes contain the 50th percentiles while bars contact the 95th percentiles—distributions are across all
respondents to the survey and across stochastic realisations. (Main results are based on an SEIR model with a latent period of 4 days (and three latent
classes), and an infectious period of 2 days; other points, in blue, use a latent period chosen from a lognormal distribution10 and an infection period
between 2 and 3 days, and are based on a model with one, two or three latent and infectious classes).
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What is already known on this topic
► Contact tracing is known to be highly effective for diseases that
spread slowly by close contact, and hence is used for many
sexually transmitted infections.
► Quantitative predictions of contact tracing have generally focused
on the speed of tracing, and used assumed contact patterns. These
studies have shown that control is most effective when the latent
period is long and the disease transmits slowly.
What this study adds
► By considering the distribution of close contact encounters, we are
able to predict the efficiency of contact tracing in identifying
secondary cases.
► The UK definition of a close contact (15 min or more, within 2 m) is
sufficient to contain imports of infection but at the cost of tracing
many uninfected contacts.
► We would expect 10–15% of cases to generate at least one
unidentified secondary case which would need detecting by other
means.
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